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CHANGING PATTERNS OF RESISTANCE - THE CASE OF
LEEUFONTEIN AND BRAKLAAGTE IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL, 1906-1991.
Andy Manson.
On the 1st July 1989 Bophuthatswana police dispersed a meeting of villagers in Leeufontein,
situated about fifteen kilometres north of Zeerust in the western Transvaal who were protesting
against their forced removal into the Bophuthatswana homeland. The crowd was sprayed with
teargas and rubber bullets. In the ensuing confusion nine policemen and two civilians were killed
and almost the entire village fled to neighbouring white farms or made their way to
Johannesburg's black townships to seek sanctuary with friends or relatives. The village
immediately was surrounded by patrols of the South African and Bophuthatswana Police Forces
who systematically searched and detained anyone suspected of complicity in the killings. Many
suspects were routinely assaulted and over the next six months four residents were killed by pro-
government vigilantes supported by the Bophuthatswana Police.1 Subsequently the nearby village
of Braklaagte, whose fate was closely bound up with that of Leeufontein, was also abandoned.
Most of the villagers found their way to Zeerust where they spent over six months as refugees
living in tents in the grounds of the Anglican, Catholic and Methodist churches.2 Their plight
became almost a cause celebre". gaining the attention of the international community and eliciting
the personal intervention of the President of the A.N.C.who attempted to secure a safe return for
them back to their homes. Their defiance was held up as a symbol of the determination of rural
Batswana to resist the homeland system.
These events were however the culmination of a long saga of opposition by the two communities
to forces bent on undermining their political independence and social cohesion. This story
stretches over eighty years and contains within it many of the elements which comprise the
experience of rural communities in South Africa in this century. Also discernible are the shifts and
moods of the modern South African state as it manoeuvered to control African rural society and
to execute more effectively its ideological goals. This paper then examines the history of these
people and attempts to locate the changing pattern of their resistance in the context of twentieth
century developments. Such a task requires a close examination of the dynamics of the internal
political functioning of these communities, without which the pattern and intensity of their defiance
has little meaning.
The Origins of Leeufontein and Braklaagte
The communities of Braklaagte and Leeufontein belong to a Tswana-speaking community, the
Hurutshe, who have for close to four hundred years occupied land in the Marico district close to
the border with modern Botswana.In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Hurutshe
established in what was known as Moiloa's Reserve, a politically cohesive and economically
productive polity.^
The origins of Braklaakte and Leeufontein can be traced to developments following the death of
the Hurutshe chief Ikalafyn in 1893. Ikalafyn's son Pogiso was too young to assume leadership
and Ikalafyn's brother, Israel Keobusitse, was appointed regent in his place. In 1903 Pogiso came
of age but it was only in 1906 that the state acted to resolve the question of chieftaincy.
The reason for this belated intervention lay in the wider ambitions of the Milner administration
rather than in any notions of governmental regard for questions of chiefly legitimacy. Milner's post
South African War government was intent on restoring the mining industry to pre-war levels of
production which entailed, among other things, the provision of adequate labour to the mines. An
important element in the State's plan was the re-ordering of rural African society through the
Native Affairs Department, to allow for a stricter control over the provision of labour.4 Chiefs
considered inimical to British-interests in the Transvaal consequently were forced into line or
removed from their posts. Israel, in the opinion of Britsh officials, fell into such a category and
Pogiso's claim to chieftaincy suddenly presented them with the opportunity to replace him.5
Though Pogiso had an undeniable claim to chieftaincy of the Hurutshe, Israel refused to step
down. The reason for this was that after Ikalafyn's death, Israel had married his brother's chief
wife and had "raised up seed" with her. In terms of a Hurutshe custom which conferred
succession upon the eldest son of the first wife, regardless of whom the real father may have
been, Israel considered the son of this union to be the rightful chief, Ikalafyn not having fathered
a son with his chief wife.(Pogiso was his son from another wife.) Israel considered that he should
continue as chief until this boy, Maje, reached his seniority.
Though an identical situation had given rise to a schism within the chiefdom in earlier years
which the British authorities had sanctioned, they chose on this occasion to oppose Israel's claim,
undoubtedly because the Government was determined to install a more compliant and co-
operative leadership in the Hurutshe reserve. In April 1906 therefore, the Executive Council
approved Pogiso's appointment as chief, believing that Israel would quietly relinquish his authority.
It proved a critical error on the State's behalf. Not only was Israel's support far stronger than
local officials had estimated, but he was also able to mobilise this support in a most effective
way. Israel presented Pogiso as an "outsider", a Christian who would undermine traditional
practises such as bQfladi and rainmaking activities. Israel also shifted his attack from appeals to
tradition to the arena of modem colonial public contestation. Firstly he sought the advice of a
local attorney in Zeerust (who was warned off from taking the case by the Commissioner for
Native Affairs),6 and secondly he collected £150 from his supporters and travelled to Cape Town
where he engaged the services of Francis Peregrino, the West African editor of the South African
Spectator -actions remarkably resolute for one considered "weak and vascillating" by the Colonial
authorities.7 Israel also headed a deputation to see Lord Selbourne, the High Commissioner, who
happened to be touring the district in mid-1907, and put his case to the "Great Father" (as
Selbourne self-effacingly described himself).8
The government, sensing that it had a fight on its hands, banished Israel from the reserve.
Following a common Hurutshe expedient, Israel slipped across the border to the sanctuary of the
Bechuanaland Protectorate while his followers moved onto two farms, Petrusdam and Leeufon-
tein. Leeufontein had been purchased by the Hurutshe in 1876, though this fact appeared to
unknown to the government in 1907.9 Windham, the Secretary for Native Affairs, consequently
ordered them to move off the two farms, a command which was ignored, the Zeerust magistrate
reporting in January 1908 that "the attitude they have now taken up is of absolute defiance to my
authority".10 This defiance was based on the fact that the Hurutshe could prove that they had
legal title to the eastern portion of Leeufontein.
Consequently, the pattern of control that the government wished to impose over this remote rural
community was disarranged, not only by the determination of Israel's people to resist but also
because the Hurutshe, like many African communities in the western Transvaal, were quick to
see the advantages of purchasing land outside their reserve.11 Security on the land thus enabled
them to mount a successful defence of their political independence. Moreover, in August 1908,
Israel despatched five of his leading men to buy a neighbouring farm, Braklaakte, for £1.500.
Rather shrewdly these men, led by Israel's brother, Malebalele, did not disclose their association
with Isreal when the transaction was conducted.12 Thus in 1911 the government was forced to
accept Israel's chieftaincy over the Hurutshe who had moved onto the two farms.
A notable feature of the struggle to preserve their identity in this early period was the support
given to Israel himself by his followers. This attraction for chieftaincy was common among rural
communities facing a threat to their traditional rural identities and claims to land in the early
decades of the twentieth century at a time when productive enterprises were organised around
the chieftaincy. 13 The apparent inability of the state to shake this support for Israel was because
it could not immediately find, in Pogiso, an effective collaborationist base on which to rebuild an
alternative chieftaincy at Dinokana.
In Limbo, 1911-1940.
Although the two Hurutshe groups were now recognised as legal occupiers of their farms it did
not follow that they were to be accorded "independence" from the main house at Dinokana. The
following thirty years were characterised by attempts to encourage a "healing of the breach", and
by efforts to coerce the breakaway factions to accept the authority of the chiefs at Dinokana. The
attitude of the Department of Native Affairs appeared to shift in response to the attitudes of the
chiefs at Dinokana themselves- when such chiefs were in favour with the administration then unity
was encouraged, when they were unco-operative then unity was shelved. This changeable and
contradictory situation arose out of the colonial desire to bring the local ruling classes into the
centre of the colonial state and the simultaneous determination on the part of many chiefs to
hang on to all possible areas of administrative, judicial, executive and economic control. A
proliferation of chiefs claiming separate powers futher militated against efficient administration.
Attitudes also altered in response to new policy, especially from the late 1920's when "legitimate
authorities" were sought out in rural areas to support the segregationist principles which then
infused official thinking.14
Up to the death of Pogiso in 1908 the relationship between the separatists and the Dinokana
section remained fairly hostile. The prospects of reconciliation looked so slim that the idea was
not even mooted. However, after Pogiso's death, the Native Commissioner (N.C.) considered
reconciliation to be inevitable.15 When this again appeared illusory official attitudes hardened,
especially towards the people in Braklaagte. "It would create a very bad precedent", wrote the
N.C. in 1922, "to now recognise this body of malcontents"(in Braklaagte).16 Shortly thereafter, in
1924, Israel died and prospects rose once again for a re-unification of the Dinokana house and
the Leeufontein separatists. There were reasonable grounds for thinking this, for Israel's son,
Monnamere, who had formerly quarrelled with his father (over the taking of a wife) had not
moved to Leeufontein with his father.and chose to remain in Dinokana.17 This fact allowed
relations between Dinokana and Leeufontein to remain at least stable.
On the other hand, relations between Braklaagte and Dinokana remained very tense during the
1920's and after. Malebelele continued to challenge the right of Pogiso's decendants to the
chieftainship of Dinokana. A faction within Dinokana consequently opposed a reassertion of
authority over Braklaagte, believing that this would destabilise political condtions in their town.
This bedevilled further the state's attempts to force recognition of the seniority of the Dinokana
chieftaincy The NAD nevertheless continued to exert pressure upon the Braklaagte community by
delaying registration of the transfer of their land, an act which it recognised would have accorded
them "a separate tribal identity". In 1924 the NC made this point absolutely clear when he told
Malebelele that he would refuse transfer of ownership until "the occupiers of the farm (Braklaakte)
recognisejhe^ Paramount cnieLat7Dinokana"r1^ It was only in 1929 that EJansen, the Minister of
Native Affairs, signed a special consent form registering Brakiaagte in his name in trust for the
Hurutshe at Brakiaagte.19
This was not the end of this particular episode by any means. Transfer of the farm was delayed
because by 1930 a conflict had broken out between George Moiloa, the new chief at Brakiaagte
following Malebelele's death, and Abraham Moiloa, the new chief at Dinokana. The root of this
conflict lay in Abraham's determination to unify and integrate all the various Hurutshe factions
during a period of internal challenge to the traditional authorities from a small but increasingly
powerful class of wealthier farmers in the reserve.20 This attempted concentration of power
occurred at a time when the "tide of state policy was flowing towards a more substantial role for
chiefs".21 Allied to this was the state's need to prevent a proliferation of jurisdictions jockeying for
a share in the hegemony and revenue afforded to functionaries who became integrated into the
state system. Thus in Moiloa's reserve the laws and customs of the Hurutshe had been
assiduously researched by the NAD ethnologist, G.Lestrade, who identified Abraham as the
legitimate customary ruler. Thus for the sake of rationalisation and the symmetry of traditional
order, it was felt that the Brakiaagte faction should not be granted full "independence" from the
Dinokana house.22
Consquently in 1936 the government actually reversed the tendency to accord Brakiaagte a
degree of autonomy and redefined "Dinokana Location" to grant Abraham civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Brakiaagte in terms of the Native Administation Act of 1927.23
However three years later events took another unexpected turn. By 1939 Abraham's behaviour
had become a threat to orderly adminisration in the reserve. His attempts to mobilise support
against "progressive" elements undermining his position in Moiloa's reserve had led him to
overstep the acceptable bounds of his jurisdiction.24 In 1939 the NC advised that as "the chief's
attitude makes proper administrative control impossible, I can suggest nothing short of summary
dismissal."2^ One of Abraham's punishments was to strip him of his powers in Brakiaagte.
Therefore the Brakiaagte faction was once more recognised by the government as a "separate
tribal entity" under George Moiloa and the Governor-General cancelled the definition of the
location as proclaimed in 1936 to now exclude Brakiaagte.26
Thus the destiny of the Brakiaagte community lay entirely in the variable and contradictory nature
of state policy as it struggled to tighten the reins of its control over the complex web of
institutions and customs that prevailed in the African rural reserves. A further contradiction was
introduced in this instance by the government's desire to develop Moiloa's reserve, in 1920
designated as "a model native area",27 and the quite blatant efforts of Abraham to marginalise
the very class of producers identified by the NC and agricultural extention officers as being the
key to increased production. This contradiction between Abraham's intentions and the state's
plans for the economic and administrative future of the reserve led to the need to replace
Abraham. In trying to arrive an idea of the consciousness of individual rural communities it is
important elucidate in some detail these manifold contradictions and their specific consequences
for African producers attempting to eke out an existence on the land.2**
On the other hand the disruptions faced by the two communities examined here were due to the
determination of chiefly lineages to maintain some influence while the state sought to instal
conservative rural hierarchies in the reserves. "Chieftaincy", as Beinart has argued," provided the
kind of institution, and set of symbols, behind which rural people could unite at a local level and
stake claims to land and communal rights."29 However, as Beinart rightly notes, such support for
chiefs did not necessarily imply a yearning for a return to pre-colonial rule with its numerous
tributary obligations. "Rather, they (rural people) hoped to instal a political process which would
allow popular participation in decision making and popular control over (their) bounded world.".30
Internal Ruptures 1940-1984.
The recognition by the Executive Council of Braklaagte's autonomy lent a certain stability to
political affairs in the village, but soon internal divisions began to surface.Similar divisions too
were faced in Leeufontein. While this internal dissension itself was not particularly unique, the
way the state later intervened to refashion circumstances to its own wishes was, and provided
the prelude to the disastrous events which later engulfed these settlements.
In order to set out these divisions clearly we need to return to Israel's death in 1924. When
Israel fell sick in 1923 he was invited to spend his last days with his brother Malebelele, in
whose district he died. Israel's son, Monnamere, then ruled in Leeufontein, being recognised
formally as "headman" with civil and criminal jurisdiction in 1941, just a year prior to his death.31
Monnamere was followed by his son Israel Seruthe Moiloa.(Seruthe for easy identification). At
Braklaagte, the succession question became a lot more confused and blurred. Israel apparently
appointed George, his son from his second wife, to be the new chief, but his brother Malebelele
appointed his. son, John Sebogodi, as the next in line. This dual appointment occurred because
Malebelele considered Braklaagte and Leeufontein to be separate tribal entities thus giving him
the right to appoint an heir, while Israel considered himself chief of both communities. This
predicament did not immediately pose a problem because John Sebogodi left the village, thus
temporarily relinquishing his right to leadership. For many inhabitants however, George was
considered as only a regent, and indeed when he died in 1948 Sebogodi returned to take over.
The Native Affairs Department accorded him the status of "acting headman", but the version
preferred by many was that Sebogodi was the rightful claimant, having been confirmed in his
appointment by Abraham who was the chief of the senior section of the Hurutshe. In the
meanwhile George's son, Moitasilo Edwin, remained in the wings awaiting his chance to advance
his claim.32
In the 1950's, the residents of the two farms faced yet another threat to their existence as
separate communities. The National Party, in persuance of a more complete separation of land
ownership in South Africa, designated the two areas as "black spots" amongst white farmland. In
1954, a Native Affairs minute directed that the inhabitants "must be advised that all possible
steps will be taken to have them removed."33 Failure to co-operate would lead to direct
expropriation. This edict obviously created alarm when conveyed to the people against whom it
was directed. In January 1955 chief Abraham from Oinokana headed a delegation to see the
Secretary of Native Affairs in Pretoria to seek assurances that the people of Leeufontein and
Braklaagte would not be removed from their farms, though the outcome is not clear from the
evidence.34 Its significance lies not only in the fact that it introduced a new element of fear and
mistrust, but also that it opened up new divisions in the community at Leeufontein where Seruthe
colluded with the authorities- a line of action that later culminated in his sudden flight from the
village.
It was not however Seruthe's collaboration in this case that led to his precipitous departure, but
Tiis role irrthejinti-pass struggle ffiat suddenly gripped the attention of all residents of Moiloa's
Reserve in 1955. The curiously worded Abolition of Passes Act of 1952 forced African men and
women to carry reference books. However the issuing of reference books was interpreted, by
rural women especially, as a constraint upon their ability to move to urban areas to seek work
and the advantages flowing from such contact.35 The story of the opposition mounted by the
Hurutshe to the taking of these reference books has now passed into the history of rural
resistance in South Africa in the 1950's and 1960's.36 In general terms, this resistance was
related to a wave of revolts throughout South Africa directed against the symbols of influx control
or against rehabilitation measures which were perceived as a threat by most sectors of rural
producers. The Bantu Authorities Act created the "authorities" who were to be accountable to the
NAD for the implementation of these measures. Thus it was that in Leeufontein Seruthe found
himself at odds with most residents who actively opposed acceptance of the reference books.
The village descended into violence as scores of men and women were arrested, harassed, and
beaten by the South African police. For his own protection Seruthe was forced to accept a
bodyguard, upon whom "fell the privilege of conducting raiding columns through the village in the
dead of night and indicating (to the police) the inmates whose households required attention."
37(A euphenism for assault or arrest). In the end, civil conflict led to the burning of fifteen homes
belonging to those who accepted, or had indicated acceptance, of the despised reference books.
38 According to Hooper.a Zeerust based Anglican priest who was in close contact with
Leeufontein at this time, the village experienced the most "concentrated and intense brutality" of
any in the district.39
Leeufontein and Braklaagte's response to the imposition of passes was shaped by the experience
of migrant labour and the changes it had wrought over the years. Although the land occupied by
the two communities was favourable for grazing, it had become overstocked by the 195O's.4u
Moreover land in Moiloa's Reserve, to which many residents still appeared to have had access,
was being increasingly utilised by the "progressives". Using the Moiloa Reserve Local Council as
a base for their operations, this group had monopolised the benefits of agricultural expenditure in
the Reserve.41 Faced with increasing rural pressures, a growing number of men and women
began to tramp the well-worn path to the Reef in the 1940's and 1950's to form part of the
migrant proletariat. In 1951 Breutz estimated that eight to ten thousand of the Reserves
approximately 50,000 population were migrants.42 In Braklaagte and Leeufontein, Breutz
estimated about a third of the residents to be migrants.43
As was the case in Sekhukhuneland migrant organisation played a crucial role in sustaining the
resistance.44 Significantly, Hurutshe migrants in the city were able to thrust aside local squabbles
and grievances and when the threat of state interference raised its head they were in a position
to act swiftly and decisively. This was facilitated by the formation of the Bahurutshe Association
on the Reef whose staunchest supporters came from the Braklaagte and Leeufontein villages.45
Hurutshe migrants met on a regular basis at Newclare (termed their "headquarters") or sent
representatives from the mines principally employing Hurutshe migrants -such as Rand Leaser
Durban Deep, Crown Mines. Men from the East Rand would also make their way to Newclare on
appointed Sundays. During 1956 and 1957 meetings were chaired by Abraham Sebogodi, the
chief's brother. Their business centred around the organisation of stokvels and burial societies,
the latter, as Delius has shown in his study of Pedi migrants, increasingly " claim(ing) widespread
migrant membership".46 Once the trouble flared up in the reserve it was relatively simple to
arrive at decisions and to act swiftly upon them. For example funds were immediately released to
hire cars to ferry the migrants home to Moiloa's reserve (though the A.N.C.also provided cars)
and lawyers were contacted in Johannesburg to defend Leeufontein residents who had been
arrested for burning down the houses of people loyal to the government.47 The nucleus of
resistance had by the 1950's shifted to well organised migrants who were leading, rather than
being led by, supportive chiefs-the official Commission of Enquiry established afterwards is replete
with instances of "Johannesburg Natives" simply taking over meetings in the makgotla and
intruding chiefs to take appropriate measures.4^
After the disturbances the Commission mentioned above recommended that both Leeufontein and
Braklaagte be"expropriated as soon as possible since ...the delay in doing so is one of the
causes of the unrest."49 Not surprisingly Seruthe, whose position at Leeufontein had become
untenable, in 1958 gladly accepted an offer to move to Driefontein, an area within Moiloa's
reserve. He was accompanied by only a handful of supporters, the rest successfully launching a
court application to prevent their removal.50 Seruthe thus relinquished his authority over
Leeufontein but was shortly thereafter installed as chief at Dinokana after the incumbent
Abraham, the leading chief in the resistance, had been deposed. Ironically, a chief from
Leeufontein thus became head of the Dinokana faction after years of refusal to recognise the
independence of the Leeufontein chiefs from the Dinokana house.This occurred simply because it
was now no longer expedient to support the ruling family at Dinokana and because Seruthe had
shown himself to be loyal to the state. Seruthe's brother, Moswana David Moiloa, became chief
at Leeufontein. Moswana's position during the revolt had not been as unambiguous as that of his
brother however and consequently he was not accorded legal recognition by the government.
To summarise the situation regarding leadership, by the beginning of the 1960's there was in
each community an alterative authority -in Braklaagte in the person of Mortasilo Edwin and in
Leeufontein in the person of Seruthe and later his son Godfrey- which could be promoted to
leadership if the need arose; and indeed, as subsequent events will show, this need did arise.
The presence of this alternative chieftaincy at the same time weakened the capacity of the two
communities to act in unity and raised the level of civil conflict in the communities.
Bophuthatswana - A Cloud on the Horizon, 1960-1983.
Probably the intensity of opposition deterred the government from immediately incorporating or
removing the people of Leeufontein and Braklaakte. The inaccessibility of official records makes it
difficult to determine what the reason for the apparent delay was. The plan was not retracted
however, for in 1966 the farms were expropriated by the South African Trust with the intention of
resettling the population within the Tswana Territorial Authority, an interim stage on the road to
the creation of an independent Tswana "state". Thus the two settlements were inexorably swept
along in the current of the Grand Apartheid policy. However because of the cumbersome and
labyrinthine nature of this system the affected communities were not able to find either the
appropriate time or issue to fight their case.
A lenghty period of time was to elapse before the incorporation plan was set in operation. The
expropriation did not entail any change of status as far as the chiefs were concerned, but the
insecurity caused by the delay must have hung over the community like a sword of Damocles. In
1975 consolidation proposals suggested that two farms, Bergvliet and Rietgat, be given over as
land on which to settle the two communities.51 This was never carried into effect, though a
Bophuthatswana Commission of Enquiry into Local and Regional Government in 1981 described
the Hurutshe at Leeufontein and Braklaagte as "tribes still to be resettled."52 By the late 1970's
however, Bophuthatswana had had become a reality and provided apparent "evidence" of the
viability of the homeland policy. Thus the idea of consolidating these areas into Bophuthatswana
superceded the scheme to resettle the population at Bergvleit and Rietgat. This shift was
indicated more clearly in the 1977 Status of Bophuthatswana Act which effectively deprived
Leeufontein and Braklaagte residents of their South African citizenship. Despite the recommenda-
tions of a Commission (of Co-operation and Development) report which suggested the farms be
retained as "black spots", the South Arican government persisted with the plan of incorporation.
The proposals were announced on the 5th. of June 1983 and the advice or objections of
interested parties was called for.53
"Spiked by the Prickly Pear" - The Contest over Incorporation , 1983-1990.
When it became known, this decision sparked off another round in the bitter and prolonged
attempt by the two communities to preserve a measure of independence. It was only in 1986 that
Braklaagte residents got wind of what was happening, for the proposals calling for objections
received limited coverage in the media and did not therefore come to their attention. Thus
incorporation plans, in the face of no apparent objections, were presented as a fait accompli at
the end of 1986. The community responded by signing a petition, with 3,000 signatories, rejecting
incorporation. They offered the following reasons for doing so:
a) That they would permanently lose their South African citizenship and become citizens of a
state not recognised internationally.
b) They would lose their right to work in South Africa.
c) Having indicated their opposition to incorporation they would be likely to face discrimination
from the Bophuthatswana authorities- a point which became evident later on.
d) Social, Educational and Health services were of an inferior standard in Bophuthatswana and
there was the possibility that they would be denied access to these services.
e) That the Bophuthatswana government, by foisting an unpopular and illegitimate chief upon the
community, would destroy the fabric of social order that had long existed.54
The South African government in June 1987 agreed to consult the community regarding
incorporation but in fact failed to do so until December 1988. At the meeting which finally did
eventuate between the residents' leaders and government officials the latter agreed to consider
the views of the community.
Notwithstanding this undertaking, the attorneys acting for the Braklaagte residents were informed
that incorporation (of both areas) would be gazetted on the 31st of December 1988. A rule oisi
was granted and the state was forced to supply reasons why the case should noi be sei aside.
During this hearing it became evident that papers incorporating Braklaagte had been signed a full
week before the meeting at the beginning of December, indicating that the government had no
intention of considering the opinions of the Braklaagte residents. The state's intention to press
ahead with incorporation was, to use the words of the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC)
"to say the least, puzzling".55 Previously communities such as Moutse had deliberately been
relocated outside Bophuthatswana and "black spots" in the Eastern Cape had been reprieved
from removal into the Ciskei. Moreover from late 1988 the South African government had
committed itself to a reform policy, which was allegedly to be more sensitive to the plight of black
South Africans. A possible reason for the refusal to recind the decision was the fact that
Bophuthatswana was considered at the time to be a model homeland which needed support.
On the 10th March 1989 the Supreme Court ruled the proclamation (no.R220) incorporating the
area, to be valid. Within a fortnight Braklaagte was plunged into a spiral of disorder and violence.
A police camp was established to guard the state's protege Moitasilo Edwin and his property, and
police roadblocks were set up to identify anti-incorporationists. School children especially were
targeted. Once identified, these opponents of the homeland system were assaulted and detained.
When the angry and frightened villagers attempted to meet to discuss these incidents, their
gatherings were violently broken up by the security forces. Pupsey Sebogodi, the acting chief was
detained, along with over a hundred others, under Bophuthatswana's security measures. Sixty-five
people subsequently were charged with public violence. Access to support from the outside was
cut off -for example the village doctor was refused entry (presumably because he would observe
the extent and seriousness of the beatings), and TRAC and Black Sash officials were banned
from operating in the district. Lawyers even had difficulty in getting access to imprisoned clients,
having to threaten to issue court interdicts in order to see them. Finally, the only hope for a
reprieve failed when the Braklaagte appeal against incorporation was rejected.56
A short distance away at Leeufontein the residents observed these developments with growing
alarm, for their fate obviously was bound to that of Braklaagte. Meetings of the lekgotla (tribal
council) were held in January and further meetings held with the community occurred on an
almost weekly basis. A petition signed by the chief, his councellors and most of the residents
rejecting incorporation was forwarded to the authorities. In March Bophuthatswana police
encamped at Edwin's farm began to intimidate residents and to question them about their
allegiances. Following the assault of high school pupils at a roadblock and their subsequent
arrest, a school boycott was mounted to protest against police actions and the forced re-
incorporation. In April the police attempted to arrest two men at Leewfontein. A confrontation
between the crowd which gathered and the police took place and the latter used teargas and
rubber bullets to disperse the onlookers. At this, the community took fright and nearly 4,000 fled
to a neighbouring white farm. The owner, a Mr. Paul van der Merwe, in a gesture unusual for the
conservative white farmers (although many were his own labourers) gave them sanctuary and
protection from further police harassment.57
In May, in an attempt to defuse a dangerous situation, the South African ambassador to
Bophuthatswana agreed to meet the community. He did little other than to restate the official
position of the two governments and left the meeting precipitously without addressing the
residents' complaints. Just over a week later, on May 19, Bophuthatswana's President Mangope
visited Leeufontein together with a large police contingent. Mangope threatened the villagers,
warning them not to "abuse" him. "Do not play games with me", he is reported to have added, "if
you do, I will prick you and curse you like the prickly pear".58 such threats only incensed the
villagers even more and it needed only a spark to ignite a dangerous conflagration. This is
precisely what happened on the 1st July when police arrived to break up the meeting to protest
against incorporation and it was this act that led to the tragic events described at the beginning
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of this article.
As reference to the schools boycott and the assault of schoolchildren would indicate, more light
role played^ by the youthin the defiance. In January 1989 theyJormed
themselves into a Youth Association with representatives in each of the wards(kgoro). Later this
organisation affiliated to the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). On the 29th
December 1990 almost 2,000 students from the two villages joined the A.N.C. Youth League.
Meetings of this Youth Organisation took place outside the villages so as to avoid detection.
Amongst their activities were the collection of bail money, the organisation of protest meetings
against police conduct, the school boycott and "conscientising" activities such as the perfomance
of plays depicting oppression in the villages.5^ To summarise, though the population at large
opposed incorporation, the youth played a central role in organisation of the resistance, and in
combatting both those elements favouring links with Bophuthatswana as well as the police. A
measure of this participation is reflected in the fact that 129 scholars were arrested and charged
with a range of offences under the category of public violence. This is not to suggest that
migrants played no role -the fact that meetings were held on week-ends when they could be
present testifies to their continued involvement in affairs.60 Similarly the role of chiefs remained
crucial, particularly as the issues of leadership and local autonomy were central to the affair. As
the crisis deepened the part played by Pupsey Sebogodi, son of the deposed chief, became
fundamental. He remained in close contact with support groups in Johannesburg which took up
the cause for the two communities and he travelled abroad to seek support for their plight. He
was one of the first chiefs to join the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
(CONTRALESA) in the Western Transvaal where he holds an executive position. Nevertheless, a
significant feature is the increased involvement of younger people in the events between 1989
and 1991.
The Manipulation of Authority.
A noteworthy feature of government strategy in the incorporation issue was its attempts to
legitimise its actions on the grounds of traditional or customary practise, an obsession which had
preoccupied officialdom from the onset in its relationship with the two communities. In the colonial
era the institution of chieftainship was recognised as an essential political instrument of control
and its value persisted into the apartheid period, despite the arsenal of legislation which the
modern South African state had at its disposal to impose control over the African population.
Futhermore, having once created a system based on "traditional" structures it became neccessary
to pursue it to its bitter (though not neccessarily logical) end. As this discussion has indicated,
this intervention had the added effect of dividing ,or further dividing, rural society and thereby
weakening its capacity to resist state intervention.61 The state's gambit in dividing the leadership
of the Hurutshe was laid in the 1950's with the deposition of Abraham Moiloa and the the co-
option of a significant section of the chiefship, most notably the Mangope family based at
Moswedi. Whereas the colonial administations had failed to effectively identify and entrench a
collaborationist base, the National party government was more sussessful at doing so.
In the past decade or so the primary purpose of the South African and Bophuthatawana regimes
in their dealings with the communities under discussion has been to reduce the powers of the
anti-incorporationist chiefs by dismissing them and strenghening those elements in favour of
homeland policies. This course of action was legitimised on the grounds that the Leeufontein and
Braklaagte factions were subordinate to the Dinokana house, an argument which had been used
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at convenient points in the past. Government ethnologists were thus engaged by the South
African Department of Development Aid to support this contention, and a carefully constructed
argument was devised to try and justify the Dinokana chiefs' paramountcy over those at
Leeufontein and Braklaagte.62
Its confidence sustained by this supposedly authoritative and authentic information, the
government then manoevered to oust the anti-incorporationists. In 1983 Edwin Moitasilo was
appointed to administer a Braklaagte cattle post at Welverdient, an area that had been
incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1979 amid much acrimony over the loss of land. In 1984
Godfrey Moiloa visited Braklaagte, accompanied by Bophuthatswana officials, to try and persuade
the community to accept him as chief. This overture was firmly rejected. Tribal records however
were loaned to Godfrey for him to consult, an act which Moiloa interpreted as "acceptance" of his
jurisdiction. In May 1988 John Sebogodi was removed from the headmanship of Braklaagte by
the Department of Constitutional Planning and Godfrey was appointed as chief in both
Leeufontein and Braklaagte. It should be noted that prior to this Sebogodi effectively administered
both villages, for Moswana David Moiloa had left Leeufontein for the Wrtwatersrand in 1965
leaving Sebogodi as acting headman. Though Moswana returned in 1975 he had continued to
allow Sebogodi to administer affairs, acting as his assistant. In August 1988 Godfrey Moiloa, now
in charge of the entire district, appointed Edwin as "traditional headman" in Braklaagte.6^ No
attempt was made to inform either community of these appointments, a strong inference that the
two administations wished to delay the announcements until after incorporation. As the attorney
for the Leeufontein accused charged, the decision to recognise Edwin and Godfrey Moiloa as
headman and chief respectively was "clearly part of a strategy to enable the minister (of
Education and Development Aid) to contend that the Leeuwfontein chief and his tribe had agreed
to incorporation".64
What emerges from this discussion regarding chieftainship is that both the South African and
Bophuthatswana administrations intervened decisively in the affairs of the two communities in
order to prop up "legitimate" authorities who would promote both the ideology and functioning of
the homeland system. Such an intervention flies in the face of local leadership patterns and
characteristics and severely disrupted and disturbed social and economic life in the villages.
Beyond this, such interference contradicted earlier official statements of recognition of the of the
two communities as independent, though junior, sections of the Hurutshe. To have taken away
this recognition was to deny and negate their history.
Conclusion.
Three broad points will be made here. Firstly, the struggle waged by the residents of Leeufontein
and Braklaagte against incorporation represented a serious though recurrent episode in a long
and varied history of resistance to attempts to circumscribe and limit their independence and
autonomy. This has imbued these people with a deep sense of interdependence and, in the
words of an anthropologist who has studied them, "a profound collective consciousness which
dominates their perception."65 This perception has grown out of their experience of being harried
and provoked by regimes which imposed intermittent and often contradictory legislation and
strategies upon them. It was this common experience and perception which led to the
spontaneous and collective actions of July 1st. 1990. Conversely it was this very unity which the
authorities sought to destroy by favouring and supporting the interests of a group of rural
sympathisers who could be found to have traditional claims to control of the Hurutshe at
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Leeufontein and Braklaagte.
Secondly what also emerges from this study of these two villages is the vitality and ingenuity of
"porrticaTfj[e~in a ruraTarea orSoytFTAfrica. The inhabitants demonstrated a sound conception of
the importance of linking their struggle with wider political forces and structures, and of exploring
avenues of action afforded by the urban\rural connection which was developed through the
migrant labour system.
Thirdly one has to consider the implications of all this for the economic security and wellbeing of
the two communities involved. Each round of crises disrupted economic activities. In 1957 and
1958 a significant number of people fled from Moiloa's reserve (and from Leeufontein and
Braklaagte) and this abandonment of lands has been put forward as an important reason for the
collapse of agriculture in the region.66 The loss of the cattle post and land at Welverdient in
1977 when it was incorporated into Bophuthatwana "seriously depleted the communities' capacity
to engage in certain types of agriculture."67 Similarly, in 1990 and 1991 activities again came to
a virtual halt and some villagers who had left could not find cattle and other possessions on their
return.68 In assessing the capacity of rural commnuities to reconstruct the local economy one
needs to bear in mind that progress in the past has been impeded by political actions and
imperatives that theoretically should have less impact in a more democratic dispensation.
A final significant feature of the history of Leeufontein and Braklaagte is the changing context of
resistance and the consciousness of those who were in the forefront of this resistance. Their
battles in the 1910's and 1920's were directed largely to securing certain title to land and a
recognition of their separation from the main Hurutshe house at Dinokana. After a quiet period in
the 1940's this gave way to the 1950's fight against a policy which threatened the tenuous rural
base which they clung to, and to the last decade when they resisted the culmination of the
apartheid policy in the form of the homelands system. Significantly, in each phase of this conflict
different elements in their society -chiefs and elders, migrants, youth- assumed the limelight,
though none departed the stage entirely.
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(Chief at Dinokana)
Monnamere Moiloa
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Seruthe
(Chief at Dinokana)
1959
Godfrey Moiloa
Edwin Moitasilo
Moswana David
John Sebogodi
INTRODUCTION
A viable transport infrastructure is crucial for economic development. Such an infrastructure
usually converts a country into a compact economic unit, linking up areas of economic
significance. An economic utility of such vital importance must be operated efficiently and in
the interest of a wide range of economic stock holders. Given the high propensity for private
capital to accumulate profit at the expense of broad development objectives it is economically
rational to place a public utility, such as the railways, under the control of the state. State
control ensures that the vital utility is available to all who need its services. Public control
ensures that market failures associated with the private ownership of railways are to some
extent eliminated. Such market failures, caused by private capital's narrow concern with the
maximisation of its own profits, include high railway rates and insensitivity to issues of
efficiency such as the timely delivery of goods and competent management. The government can
control such market failures by taxing the owners and using the revenue to subsidise the users,
or by controlling the activities of inefficient firms. However, it is important to note that private
firms are able, via "their superior information, to get the upper hand over the regulators and
to take advantage of any improperly designed regulatory provisions."1
Some economists believe that publicly owned enterprises are inefficient and that attempts to
regulate privately owned enterprises usually result in distortions. Regulations, they argue,
serve the interests of special interest groups that are often economically uncompetitive. It has
been argued further that the slight advantages that might be produced by public ownership are
usually not large enough to compensate for the inefficiencies arising from state intervention.2
The major reasons for these inefficiencies are cited as bureaucratic red tape, rigid regulations,
incompetence and corruption, but such mistakes are also prevalent in the private sector. In
addition, I would argue that during specific historical moments private interests should be
subordinated to the broader economic interests of a country if that country is to meet the
objective of developing a strong, viable economy.
The struggle for the control of railways in southern Rhodesia should be viewed within the above
context. The British South Africa Company < BSACo > was the major shareholder of Rhodesian
railways. The company also monopolised the management of the railways. Although the
company handed over power to the Responsible Government in 1923 the company nevertheless
retained control of the railways. Subsequently, the BSACo was accused of exploiting the
recently enfranchised settlers. The settlers argued that extremely high railway rates rendered
Rhodesian products uncompetitive on international markets despite government measures to
curtail the cost of production. Given that the survival of the export-orientated Rhodesian
economy hinged on the low cost of production, the economic stake holders of the country
demanded state control or outright nationalization of the railways. The railways became the
focus of settler agitation because the state had already implemented policies making access to
land, labour and marketing less of ai problem for white settlers. Railway rates were therefore
a major obstacle which had not received any state attention. This paper endeavours to show
that, while the need to control the railways was apparent to both the settlers and government,
powers beyond their control militated against effective government intervention.
When the BSACo handed over power to the whites settlers in Southern Rhodesia, they did not
hand over the control of company assets to the responsible government. The BSACo continued
to operate its assets in the interest of shareholders. This is reflected in the rise of railway rates.
Different members of both economic and political groups expressed their dismay and their
disapproval of what they saw as extensive exploitation of the settler community in the interest
an objective shared by most members of the settler community. The government of southern
Rhodesia responded to the pleas of the community by requesting, via the intermediation of the
British government, the relinquishing of BSACo control of the Rhodesian railways. This request
was met with resistance from both the British government and the BSACo. These two connived
to hand over the control of the railways in circumstances that left the BSACo in control of the
most important aspects of the railway operations, the railway rates. Local settlers responded
to this situation by putting more pressure on the responsible government to nationalise the
railways. This objective was finally realised in 1949. This paper analyzes the debate and the
struggle for the Rhodesian railways that occurred from 1923 to 1930, and effects of the Railway
Act was passed in Southern Rhodesia.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When the settlers achieved political autonomy in 1923, the main objectives of the new
government was to speed up the economic development of Rhodesia. The new government had
to protect the developing economic sectors, namely the agricultural and mining industries, from
exploitative international capital.3 Geographically, Rhodesia is a landlocked country and
transportation of export commodities like minerals and agricultural products to the world
market depended on the railways. R. Martin, a member of parliament (MP) from the Eastern
District, argued in 1925 that:
The future development and prosperity of this country depend if not exclusively,
then very largejy on the railways and lines of communication. Without the
railways we are not going to bring the desired development. The government
should ascertain the intention of the railways for the future, whether they are
going to run the railways as a monopoly to drain this country for their benefits,
or whether they are out to give and take and be satisfied with fair profits and help
in making this country what it should be. The mining section, commercial, if they
are joined together for the development of Southern Rhodesia and the railways left
out, there is no success. The ton-mile rate in Southern Rhodesia is the highest or
one of the highest in most of the civilized world.4
Complaints about high freight charges were also made by commercial farmers especial those
represented by the Farmers Co-op and the Rhodesian Agricultural Union. On the twenty-third
annual congress of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union, the President of the Union commented
that the government should seriously consider the question of controlling the railways.5 In his
own words he said:
The government should be able to exercise such control over the railways as would
enable the people of the Colony to have an effective voice in the railway policy and
in the fixing of railway rates, and that they should have power to obtain such
detailed information as regards to the finance and administration of the railways
as would enable them to ensure that while the rates should be so calculated as to
enable the railways to pay interest on their debenture, and a reasonable dividend
on their share capital, any surplus over the standard revenue required for these
objectives should accrue to the public by being devoted to the reduction of railway
rates.6
A member of the Farmers Co-op, Mr. Laurie, also complained that export rates for grain were
excessive. The railways, he argued, " took the gilt off the ginger nut .".7 to prevent this from
happening, Mr. Laurie wanted the railways to reduce their rates. In view of the above, the new
government in S. Rhodesia had to give serious consideration to the railway issue from the time
it came to power.
THE ORIGIN AND OWNERSHIP OF THE RAILWAYS
The railways which served S.Rhodesia depended on private enterprise for their construction and
development. The construction was financed by six private companies: The Rhodesia Railway
Company Ltd., The Beira Railway Company Ltd., The Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd., The
Blinkwater Railway Company Ltd., The Rhodesia Katanga-Junction Railway and Mineral Co.
Ltd. and The Mashonaland Railway Co. Ltd. These companies managed to raise both authorised
and issued share capital. The BSACo was the largest shareholder in all the companies.8 The
company therefore had the greatest say in the management of the railways.
The BSACo had acquired its controlling interest over a period of time, through the
manipulation of various financial strategies. In 1899 the railway companies formed the
Rhodesia Trust as a holding company with capital to the value of £1 million. Through the
transference of shares, the trust acquired a controlling interest in both the Mashonaland
railway Co. Ltd. and the Rhodesia Railway Co. Ltd. By 1922 the BSACo's interests in the
Rhodesia railway Trust Ltd amounted to 85% of issued capital. The BSACo also held shares in
other railway companies. Hence it was the BSACo which provided most of the financial capital
needed by the railway companies. Before the Responsible Government, the BSACo was the
government, and the company therefore exercised both political and financial the control over
the railways. When company rule ended in 1923, the BSACo remained as a private
international company in possession of the "life blood of the whole country".9
One of the first issues faced by the Responsible Government was the question of railway rates
which played an important role in the development of a largely export oriented economy. The
issue therefore served as a test case of the political strength of the newly independent
government. It was in this context that the Responsible Government became determined to
control the railway company. The state believed that the railways had to be operated to the best
advantage of the members of the community in which the railway was situated. They attempted
to bring this about either by forcing railway companies to lower their freight charges or by
taxing profits and using the derived revenue to subsidise railway rates. These were the only
viable alternatives available to the government. Outright nationalisation was out of the
question as the government did not have finances to fund such an undertaking and had already
borrowed about six million pounds from the international capital market.
SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTION AND ITS CONSTRAINTS ON RAILWAY
POLICY
The railways were ".. in the hands of a small group in London whose interest are purely
financial."10 This is reflected by the increase in railway rates. In the 1920s the railways
increased their rates and began to show profits. Prior to 1923, Rhodesia Railways Ltd., had
payed out £160,000 in two dividends.In that year they had paid another £43,000.n In 1924,
there was a marked change in profits which led to a dividend~of~£647000 being paid to
shareholders.12 As the ordinary capital stood at £586,000 the dividend realised was
approximately 14,5 percent by the time that the income tax relief had been added.In addition
to the latter, a further £137,148 had been added to the credit balance. Mashonaland Railway
Co. had never paid dividend before 1924. Up to 1921,it had shown net profits on two occasions
only. In 1924, it paid £300,000 of £1,675,227. Losses had been made up by Rhodesia railway
Trust Co., with the ordinary capital of the company standing at £281,280. The net profit in the
year 1923/24 of £177,835 allowing also a suitable amount of pension liability.13
The increase in railway rates reduced both the agricultural surplus and mining income as their
cost of production went up. Their product's international competitiveness was equally reduced.
This problem was also acknowledged by Newton, the High Commissioner of S. Rhodesia. He
argued that most of Rhodesia's exports were raw materials"whose prices are controlled by world
wide competition. Profit margins under these conditions are generally small and high railway
rates greatly reduce profits.He then recommend that transport costs be kept as low as possible
to maintain low cost of production a reasonable profit margin for exporters of raw material.14
This recommendation was rejected by the Railway company and the British government. The
British government actually protected company interests in legislation provision of the Letters
Patent of 1921 which were enshrined in the S. Rhodesia' Constitution. Such "Reserved Clauses"
were an obstacle to economic development in the colony. They precluded the settler government
from passing laws dealing with:
railways within the colony until legislation had been passed adopting with
modification the United Kingdom law dealing with the Railway and Canal
Commissioners and the Rates Tribunal provided for it in the Railways Act of
1921... and from any laws amending the constitution.15
Thus the constitution largely protected the capitalist and powerful financial groups which
included the BSA Company and its subsidiary companies. This pro-company feeling is clearly
reflected in a comment made by Churchill,the Colonial Secretary in 1921, that:
.we need., complete good will towards enterprises which have contributed in so
large a measure to the development of Rhodesia and now so plays a part in the
scheme of Imperial Communication ... I have been impressed ... by the magnitude
of the investments made by the BSA Company in the Railways and the very heavy
burden of financial obligation assumed by the BSA Company in guarantees which
they have given to the Debenture holders.16
This shows that the settler government could not win control over the railways which had such
great a protection from the Imperial Government until 'suitable' legislation had been passed
by the new government to give due protection to companies with imperial backing. However,
law over the railways was difficult to implement because the constitution which was handed
over to the settler-government, was, "pared down to the minimum, hemmed in with limitations
and loaded with servitude".17 That constitution was designed to perform three main functions
"to protect the right of capital, prevent discriminatory legislation against Africans without
Imperial Sanction and stop Rhodesia from passing laws incompatible with the more ... interests
of the Imperial connections".18 Thus the constitution was designed to protect British interests
as far as the Africans were concerned they were discriminated. The Settler-Government was
not going to get control until it had passed the required legislation.
The New-Government, had some urgency in gaining control of the railway rates or at least some
say in the fixing of tariffs and limitation of company profits. There was also a desire by the
government of opening up new areas and the development of more established parts and all this
largely depended upon the railway services. Sir Charles Davis, the Permanent Under Secretary
at the colonial office, advised Newton, Southern Rhodesia's High Commissioner in London that
it was imperative that Legislation be passed as soon as possible after the granting of the
Responsible Government. The Legislation had to be made along lines indicated in Letters
Patent of 1921. The Responsible Government decided that an enquiry into the railways in
general and the position of each of the companies in particular be carried out. The information
so found, would enable the government to negotiate with "the BSA Company with sound bases,
on matters concerning the control of railways which was so vital economically and politically
to the colony. Before the Railway Enquiry was started, a statutory authority was first sought.
A Railway Enquiry Bill was passed on Bill number 22 of 1924. It was presented to the
Colonial Secretary of State for royal assent, with the express object of allowing the Rhodesian
Government to arrange the enquiry without in any way contravening the provision of the 1921
Letters Patent. After some delay, the Act was approved. The Government of Southern
Rhodesia, was given power related to:
Clause 2 and 3 under which Government take powers to appoint persons(s) to hold
at any time an enquiry into conduct, administration, finances and general affairs
of any railway with the result that under the Act, there could be set up permanent
Magisterial Court carrying a continuous inquiry into ... companies.19
The railway companies complained that under the above circumstances, they would be unable
to work properly and efficiently. On learning this attitude of the companies, Coghlan, the
Premier of Southern Rhodesia, said that the Railway attitude was "actually marking the
parting of ways between the Government and them as regards future policy."20 The Act was
approved by the Imperial Government and an expert in railway matters was elected. His
name was Brigadier-General F.D. Hammond.
Hammond was well qualified to conduct the enquiry. He was Royal Engineer, he had
considerable experience on railway matters and had only recently been to Nigeria on a similar
mission on behalf of the British
Government.
THE HAMMOND REPORT
General Hammond was given by the Government of Southern Rhodesia in 1924, the
memorandum of instruction on which he based his investigations. In general,Hammond was
summoned by the Southern Rhodesia Government to enquire into the conduct, administration,
finance, general affairs of the Railways and to advise the government on nationalisation. In
a large measure, he was appointed to advise the growing agrarian capital on how to reduce the
extent to which the colonial State was straddled between the metropole and the satellite
because of incompetence and lack of business ability of metropolitan capital, which inhibited
the expansion of settler capital. Hammond encountered few problems in his investigations, the
st^tifficuit jmd controversial part, was on the recommendations. With regards to the
operation of the railways and nationalisation question, Hammond recommended that:
It is now recognised universally that a railway company is not on the same footing
as an ordinary commercial concern. It performs services of public utility which are
vital to the community and enjoys in varying degrees a monopoly which has been
conferred on it by that community, its operation must therefore be subject to some
form of control.21
Hammond described the general lack of public control of the railways in Southern Rhodesia,
which formed the subject of his enquiry as "Unique". He warned the Government that:
It is not merely a question of whether it has" been abused or is abusing the
extensive powers with which it is endowed so long as it remains uncontrolled it
is in a position to do so and no civilised community can allow such a potential
danger to remain unchecked.22
The position of Railway Companies in Southern Rhodesia were unique in that they were not
subject to any form of control either over rates or profits. This situation was caused by the fact
that the BSA Company which owned the railway companies, was once the government. After
Company rule, the railway companies were regulated by Clause 20(c) by which laws dealing
with the Railway companies in the colony had to be approved by the Imperial Government.
This would operate until the legislation had been passed by the settler government. The
legislation had to adopt the provisions of the British Railway Act of 1921 with particular
emphasis on the law relating to the Railway and Canal Commissioners and to the Rates
Tribunal. Beside the difficulties imposed by the implications of the reservation regarding the
railways contained in Clause 29(e) of the Letters Patent, General Hammond observed that
control of the railways by the Southern Rhodesia Government within its own borders, would
no solve the major problem of the control of rates for imports and export. The Southern
Rhodesia Government, would not be able to legislate for those parts of the system outside the
country's border. In fact, the more profitable rates for the companies, were located outside
Rhodesia like the Congo system.23
General Hammond emphasised the problem of rates among other things. The problem of rates
stemmed from the main provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894 of the United
Kingdom, relating to the Railway and Canal Commissions. The latter Act was detrimental to
the users of the railways in that, when rates were increased, they were not asked to prove the
unreasonableness of the new rates. It was the railway companies views which were considered
only. The chief problem of the British Railway Act,1921, was that standard charges, which
acted as a ceiling were to be drawn up by the Railway Companies. The standard charge was
then handed to the main provision of the Act, which was a Railway Rates Tribunal consisting
of three members. The. standard charges had to be formed in such a way "as to yield to the
companies a standard revenue equal to the net revenue earned in 1913, a year in which the net
revenue reached the highest point together with various allowances for capital which has been
raised since ... 1913".24 The Rate Tribunal would then settle the actual schedule to be
charged, and if the average annual net revenue proved to be less than standard revenue and
6
deficit not due to lack of efficiency the tribunal had power to modify the standard charges in
an upward direction. The tribunal had the power to determine questions in regard to
conditions of carriage, alterations of rates classification, reasonableness of charges for any
services or accommodation, the appointment and disintegration of rates.
In Southern Rhodesia the application of the British Railway Act, 1921 was going to be
complicated and of little use. The major reason for the above contention was that there was
a great difference between the British railways and the Rhodesian Railways. The former
railways consisted of complete units all of which could be made and were made subject to the
Railway Act. Southern Rhodesia railways were not complete in themselves but had to be
considered with reference to the whole railway system of which the lines in Southern Rhodesia
were only a working part. That is to say, in Britain, the whole of the operations of English
railways come within the terms of the British Act. In Southern Rhodesia that could not be so.
The government of Southern Rhodesia could legislate only in respect of those portions of the
whole railway system which lie within its borders. The legislation could not embrace the
railway operations outside Southern Rhodesia. This meant that a large part of the railways
would not come under the terms of the contemplated legislation. Thus, the Act could only offer
an incomplete or partial solution. The country could not obtain full control or the most
important rates, those on export and import. It could not prescribe rates over the line which
lay outside Southern Rhodesia: for example, it could not regulate charges between Beira and
Umtali and beyond Plumtree. In fact, it was those lines outside Southern Rhodesia which were
showing more profits to the companies.(see footnote 23). This in reality meant that rates on
those lines were higher and the distances along them longer as well as the volume of traffic
higher. So the users of these lines suffered most, particularly, the landlocked Southern
Rhodesia settlers. So even if the local rates in the colony were low but export rates outside the
colony high, the settlers still suffered.
Over the specific issue of the control of the railways, Coghlan, the Prime Minister of Southern
Rhodesia did not wish to nationalise the railways. This was clearly expressed in his letter of
1925 to the High Commissioner in London. Coghlan stated that, "my idea, of course, is to
assume by legislation if possible, sufficient control of the Railways to prevent them from raising
rates against this Colony in the event of any shrinkage or loss of their Cargo traffic. Newton,
the London High Commissioner also agreed with Coghlan. Newton was well aware of the
nature of Government finance such that he could not opt for nationalisation. On the other
hand, there was a strong opinion in the country supported by among others, Downie, M. U.
Moffat and F. Johnson, a prominent farmer in favour of nationalisation of the railways or
purchasing the rights/shares of the BSA Company in the railways. However, the Government
could not raise money to nationalise the railways.25
General Hammond held the view of Coghlan, the Prime Minister. He said, that he was opposed
to the government taking over the railway. On his discussion of the possibilities of
expropriation, Hammond, estimated new profits for Southern Rhodesia in 1923/24 were
approximately £82,400. Railway Companies had to pay £140,000 for the year 1923/24 as
income tax to the S. Rhodesian Government. By applying a bonus - mileage to the Beira -
Salisbury section in pursuit of a rates reduction policy, he estimated that the net profits would
fall to £38,000. In the same year, the Railway companies would pay nearly £140,000 in income
tax to the Southern Rhodesian government so that there would be a net loss of the general
revenues of the country of some £73,000 if the railways were expropriated.26
Determination of the price of expropriation was going to be difficult because of the nature of
the companies involved in the construction of the Railway system. They did not know the right
-criterion—to—foHow~whether^to~do^t^on~the~bgsis~of net^profits, or the original cost of
construction. Expropriation, could not bring prospects of any reductions in rates since the
country could not effect control over the import and export rates. The portions of railways in
Southern Rhodesia and outside, would both suffer from separation. The railways, would be on
both sides, more expensive to run. Duplication of management, would increase expenses.
Above all, Southern Rhodesia would lose support which it was getting from wealthier sections.
Hammond finally stated that, "the advantage which Southern Rhodesia obtains from the
connection with the other more paying sections of the system is clear... From every point of
view, it is to the advantage of both the country and the Railway Companies that the system
should be maintained... as one organisation".27
In the memorandum of instruction, Hammond was advised to deal with the question as to
whether it would be in the interest of the colony to'acquire financial control of the whole
system. This was to be done through purchase of the holdings and rights of the BSA Company
in the various undertakings by which its control was assured. This position was the one made
by the Union of South Africa when the question of Southern Rhodesia joining the Union was
under discussion. The holdings and rights consisted of 1 740 151 out of 2 005 767 shares of the
Rhodesia Railways Trust Limited 423 583, 6% cumulative preference shares of the Beira -
Junction Railways and the rights of the BSA Company under the trust of Deeds relating to the
Beira company and its opinion to purchase the line and equipment of the Rhodesia Katanga
Junction Railway and the mineral Company Ltd. The colony would substitute the BSA
Company as the guarantor of debenture of the Rhodesia Railways and Mashonaland Railway
Company. The Blinkwater Railway Company would have been purchased from the Beit Railway
Trustees. The other share of the Beira and Beira Junction Railway Companies would also be
purchased. Under the provisions of the Union Government, the Union Government was to take
over the whole of the ordinary shares of the Rhodesia Railways Ltd, and Mashonaland Railway
Company held by the Rhodesia Railways Trust Ltd. A Sum of £6215,000 was mentioned as the
purchase consideration for the whole rights, interest and assets included in the agreement.28
Hammond, after spelling out the difficulties involved if the government decided to control the
Railways by purchase, did not advocate for the step. He believed that there would be opposition
from Portuguese East Africa and Northern Rhodesia. He argued that the Northern Rhodesia
government would not like to see the railway being controlled by a competitor with them. The
Portuguese government would not favour the control of railways which pass through its State,
passed into the hands of a neighbouring State because the degree of exploitation could have
been higher. The financial considerations were quite huge and frightening, argued Hammond.
The government would have to undertake the guarantee on debentures and the interest, the
total contingent liability being nearly £10 million for capital and £570,000 a year for interest.29
In addition, Hammond argued, there was a grave political danger. Employees of the Railway
system in Southern Rhodesia were nearly 2000, of whom 1800 had votes. If wives and
dependents were added, the votes would be 2,700. Total voting population amounted to 22,000,
railway votes were therefore one eighth of the total electorate.30 This was quite a high
proportion. Hammond believed that the railway workers were capable of wielding great powers
and added, "It needs no words of mine to point the political dangers of a state where one in
every eight of the votes is personally interested in donating as high wages as possible out of
railway administration".31 Hammond went on to argue that, there could be political pressure
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to obtain as low rates as possible in certain sectors of the economy at the detriment of others
or the public in general. This will cause a distortion in the development priorities based on
non-economic factors and this erodes the supportive role railways should play in developing
all sectors of the economy irrespective of regional political affiliation.
Another alternative which Hammond had to inquire into was the control of the railway system
through agreement. He was in favour of this alternative. An agreement was to be made
between the railway Companies and the Government. He felt that the few advantages of
purchase, such as control over profits and rates and power to build railways in undeveloped
areas could be obtained without incurring the risks and responsibilities attendant on state
ownership. He also believed that the BSA Company would not refuse a fair and reasonable
agreement with the Government of Southern Rhodesia. Hammond believed that the railway
companies would "recognise that the present uncontrolled situation of the railways is unique
and (that) they cannot expect it to continue".32 Agreement would specify that the net revenue
of Rhodesia Railways Ltd, Mashonaland Railway Company together should after allowances
had been made, interest and discounts on debenture and notes, income tax on the two Railway
Companies and renewals and pension liabilities on agreed scale not be longer than were
necessary to pay an agreed reasonable rate of interest on the share capital of the Trust. The
latter is the Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd.
In the event of revenues exceeding the stated amount, the surplus should be used to reduce the
rates and encourage the railway companies to render good service. Three-quarters of the
surplus revenue would be used to reduce rates and one-quarter would be used as an
inducement to stimulate traffic. In order to ensure that the surplus revenue was distributed
as agreed, Hammond suggested that a Government representative be elected. The
representative would be at the Railway Headquarters. His function would be to see that rate
reductions were made and that Southern Rhodesia got its fair share of the rate reductions.
Rates changes would have to be done only after he had been consulted. This involved a
complete change in rate policy publication if the final annual railway accounts was to be done
after the representative had gauged with accuracy the annual results. The Government
representative would therefore ensure that the government maintained up to date knowledge
of the Railway's financial activities.
In support of control by agreement, Hammond argued that the agreement would gain all the
advantages of controlling the profits and ensuring the application of low rates without any risk
and responsibilities of ownership. Such an agreement would free the country from the necessity
of raising some money to purchase the railway interests, many on foreign soil. The country
would be left with a large credit and when it wished to borrow money for development purposes
it would be limited. Hammond also stressed that control by agreement was a scheme which
would meet with support from neighbouring countries instead of their opposition. He further
anticipated that Northern Rhodesia might even want to enter as a party into the agreement
and this would act further to strengthen their position.
In the event of failure to secure an agreement with the BSA Company, Hammond advised the
government that it should request from Imperial Government authority to build a connection
from Rhodesia Railways joining with a Northern extension of South Africa Railways from
Messina. Thus the goods for export and import would use this new line and leave the Railway
company lines. The Southern Rhodesia Government was also going to introduce legislation in
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their colony in line with the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894. Under that Act, no rate or
charge could be increased without proof by railway companies before a tribunal. The railway
eompanies-hadrto-prove-the^reasonabteness7of"anyincrease. This would make any increases,
a matter of difficulty.
The government also asked Hammond to investigate and comment on the idea of constructing
competing lines which would compete with the ones in existence. On this issue Hammond
noted that:
Under no circumstances would I recommend the building of competing lines. The
Railways in Rhodesia do not carry traffic up to anything like their capacity. To
build lines in competition would result in neither the existing lines nor the
competing ones earning revenue enough to meet the expenditure incurred.
Competing railway systems mean an enormous duplication of capital, a waste in
equipment, operation and in the end public loss"33 "
The Hammond report was published in September 1925.
REACTION TO THE HAMMOND REPORT
When the report was out, it was severely criticised by both government officials and ordinary
people. These people felt that Hammond's report was biased and in favour of the BSA
Company. Among the leading critics of the Hammond Report were Downie, Fulton, Moffat and
Gilchrist. Downie was heavily in favour of nationalisation. In a letter to Moffat, the Minister
of Mines and Public Works, Downie stated that he had been disappointed by Hammond's
Report, especially his recommendation on the control. He said that he held, "isolated views as
to the best method of dealing with the Railway Companies and those controlling the system".34
Downie accused the General of having a bad view of Southern Rhodesia, that being landlocked,
it was confronted with insurmountable difficulties in introducing legislation to control the
Railway Companies serving the economy.
In dealing with capital, of the Rhodesia Railways Co. Hammond made the point that:
...practically the whole capital for construction was raised by debentures and the
interest on one was guaranteed by the BSA Company. These onerous conditions
explain why the debenture capital forms such a large proportion: if it had been
possible to raise capital on more favourable terms from the public, it may be for
granted that the others, the BSA Company would have done so, without saddling
themselves with the severe obligations.35
Downie went on to argue that the assumption of General Hammond as to the need for
debenture was quite unwanted. He accused Hammond for not being able to deal with the real
reason for his inquiry. The problem was "how best to liquidate our indebtedness to the BSA
Company for guaranteeing and assisting in the financing of the railways and how best to see
to it that the railways are administered for the benefit of Rhodesians..." The Government gave
Hammond instructions to investigate on the issue of control through purchase. The General
did not agree with the suggestion on the grounds that there would be opposition to ownership
by Southern Rhodesia. The opposition, Hammond anticipated, would come from Northern
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Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa. Downie argued that, "there was no such opposition
suggested when the BSA Company made an agreement for sale to the Government of the Union
of South Africa."36 Downie further argued that "the purchase of the assets of the Railways
Company would be by the purchase of their shares. The shares could be bought and sold like
anything else... there was nothing to hinder their being sold to the Government of the Union
of South Africa".37
Hammond warned the Government of financial dangers which they would face after purchase.
There were to be dangers of guaranteeing principal, premium and interest on £4,260,000
debentures of Rhodesia Railways Ltd and £2,560,000 of Mashonaland Railways Company. After
calculating the finances of other companies, Hammond stated that the total contingent liability
was approximately £10 million for capital and £570,000 a year for interest.38 However,
Maguire, Chairman of Rhodesia Railway Trust Co. addressing BSA Company shareholders in
1923 said:
On the other hand we do not consider the burdens of these guarantees so onerous.
As I have said, these Railways are sound supporting concerns. They pay their
debenture interests and work at a profit. No call has been made upon us under
our guarantees since 1911 and unless very unforseen circumstances arise, we do
not expect any calls will be made. That is not merely a pious aspiration.39
The Railways had shown Maguire's judgement to be correct up to the beginning of 1926.
Further Downie went on to discuss over the possible loss of the Congo traffic and the political
repercussions following purchase by the state. He disagreed on the two issues above with what
Hammond had suggested.
There were others who thought that nationalisation was not a good idea. These people opposed
to nationalisation thought that the railways were a bad investment and that the railways could
become a public liability if purchased. Hammond had emphasised that the guarantee liabilities
had to be achieved by the Government. On the same issue of purchasing the railways, Newton
wrote to Coghlan advising that:
McQuiston...Chairman of the Globe and Phoenix an M.P... impressed with
Rhodesia and its possibilities advised us to be very careful about taking over the
railways and is strongly of the opinion that, if only we can secure sufficient control
so that the railway companies may not exact inordinate profits it would be better
to leave them in their hands.40
As observed from the discussion above, the settlers were basically in two camps. There were
those who were for the purchase of the railways at once and for full control of them by the
state. These saw in Hammond's Report, a bias towards the Railway Companies. The other
camp consisted of those who wanted effective control of the Railways not through purchase but
legislation. They viewed purchase as too expensive to the government which was in financial
problems. The latter was both the result of the world depression and internal economic
problems of Southern Rhodesia. Even if the Southern Rhodesia government had decided to
purchase the railways, this could only be done with the BSA Company's consent. If the BSA
Company had agreed to sell its shares, then the Southern Rhodesia government would attain
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control over the most important rates. Those external to the colony as well as the internal
rates. However, if the BSA Company refused to sell their shares and then the government
nationaiis^ed"railways^iirside~the"i:olony, then the problem would have only~been partially^
solved.
The Railway Companies also criticised the Hammond Report. They argued that the delays in
rates reductions were due to the complicated procedures involved in the process of reducing
rates. They also gave a reason on this same issue that it took a long time, about three months,
to get a reply from their headquarters in London. There was inefficiency as far as
communication was concerned. The General Manager, Colonel Birney's late replies to crucial
issues was due to the fact that their headquarters were in London. Hammond had also
criticised the Railway Companies method of estimating reserves for renewal. Hammond had
suggested that revaluation of the cost of renewals be carried out so that over subscription to
the reserves could be prevented. Colonel Birney commented that the amount of the annual
appropriations for providing for renewals was based uporftheT estimated costs of replacement.
The appropriation was carefully and periodically renewed. It was proposed to make in 1926
a revaluation of the cost of renewing the permanent way.41 Colonel Birney disapproved
Hammond's suggestion that rates be made equal throughout the whole railway system.
Hammond had suggested that the branch lines be subsidised by the main lines. Such a
subsidisation, suggested Hammond, would help to increase the main line traffic. Birney said
that it was previously not possible since, "having regard to the special interests of the separate
Railway Companies and to the various series of debentures issue...."42 would be made difficult.
Finally the Southern Rhodesia government and the BSA Company agreed to meet in London
and discuss the issue of the control of the railway system. The BSA Company had "realised"
that their position was unique the world over. According to Downie, they had to meet in
London because the BSA Company headquarters was there, Imperial government, Nyasaland,
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Portuguese representatives were there. The government had
discovered according to the Hammond Report that effective control could only be gained if the
railways were legislated and then controlled as one indivisible unit. Coghlan, with the
instruction of the Legislative assembly, wrote a letter to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia,
requesting him to inform the British Government that the people of Southern Rhodesia wanted
to have control over the railways. The Governor wrote to the Secretary of State on behalf of
Southern Rhodesia government that:
representatives of Southern Rhodesia be allowed to go to London, to discuss in
advance, proposed railway control legislation embodying a general code suitable
to the circumstances of this colony which it is intended to place before the
legislative assembly at the forthcoming session.43
THE LONDON NEGOTIATIONS
The Government of Southern Rhodesia asked for advise from Hiley the Railway expert of the
United Kingdom. Hiley agreed with Hammond's recommendation that the Railways should be
operated as one indivisible transport system. He suggested that a Tribunal to be called the
Railway Commission be set up to control not only rates but finance policy in general throughout
the whole system. In 1926, April, Coghlan discussed the question of the control of the railways,
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he was in line with Hiley's advise. He put the matter as follows: the bill had three principles.
These were that the Railways be worked as one indivisible unit, that rates should be controlled
by an independent statutory body and finally that there would be a limitation of profits which
the railways were entitled to earn.44 Legislation had to be passed to limit returns to the
capital, debenture and proprietary interests in the railways. Regard had to be paid on the
efficient and economic working and management of the railways. Part of the total surplus
revenue was to be used for reduction of rates. Control of rates had to be made in line with
Hammond's recommendation that a public utility like a railway company had to be subjected
to some form of control. In the assembly, some members agreed to the proposals made by
Coghlan but others insisted on buying the railways even if it meant the lines inside the Colony
only. However, it was finally agreed that Coghlan's proposals be sent to England for approval
in the negotiations. The Southern Rhodesia delegates were sent to London for the negotiations
in May 1926.
Present on the negotiations were the representatives'T7)f"the three British territories namely,
Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Portuguese East
Africa was also present. The BSA Company and the British representatives were present. The
discussion started off by the comment that the BSA Company appreciated that the position of
the Railways Companies within the system was anomalous in that it was not subjected to any
statutory or governmental control in regard to the rates and fares they might charge or profits
they might derive through what in fact has been a monopoly. The BSA Company also realised
that with other governments succeeding to that of the company that old situation could no be
sustained and,
It is agreed on all hands and by none more readily than the BSA Company itself
that the legally unchecked power of the Railway Companies to make what rates
they pleased and make what profits they can should come to an end...and should
be subjected to a reasonable measure of state control.45
The burning question was to decide the limit within which and the method by which that
control should be exercised by the governments of the British territories served by the Railways
system. The BSA Company wanted to be allowed a sufficient standard revenue. The fixing of
the standard revenue according to the British Railway Act of 1921 proved to be very difficult.
It was discovered that the Railway Act of 1921 was not applicable to Southern Rhodesia in that,
unlike the British system, where there was an adequate previous performance by which to
judge what standard revenue should be. The Rhodesian system had a recent history with a too
recent growth to enable past years to provide satisfactory criterion by which to ensure future
revenue earning capacity. An agreement was finally reached under which the revenue would
be calculated with reference to an agreed return. There was another difficulty resulting from
the fact that the capital to construct the railways was borrowed. It was then agreed that the
proprietor receive a certain return, a founder royalties which would give a fair enumeration to
the paper capital.46
Another difference between the United Kingdom and the Southern Rhodesia situation was that
the whole Railway system was owned by six different companies and they entered into three
British territories and one foreign country. In Britain, the railway system was in one country.
All the countries, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland Protectorate and
Portuguese East Africa, agreed that the whole system be operated as one entity. The British
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Railway Act of 1921 provided a Rates Tribunal, the Rhodesian Railway had to be controlled by
a Tribunal to be called the Railway Commission. The Tribunal had to fix a set of rates and
randtoHo whafthey liked"
witlT the~product. The 'TriminaThad to fix rates upon a national basis calculated as near as
possible to yield a return at a stated rate upon the capital of the companies collectively. The
Tribunal had to consider their calculation at the end of each year to examine how they worked
out. The Tribunal would "distribute the results so realised so as to protect the debenture
holders of different companies and to conserve the future of the Railway system by proper
allocation of reserves".47
Negotiations continued up to 2 September, 1926. During that month, Coghlan wrote to the
Colonial secretary that they had reached an agreement. Coghlan gave him the definite
proposals in regard to the control of the Railway system and he stated that in his opinion, the
proposals afforded a fair and equitable settlement. When Coghlan and other S Rhodesians
returned home they were heavily criticised by legislative "assembly members and other settlers
who were against the Bill. Among the leading critics were prominent figures like Downie,
Colonel Frank Johnson, R A Fletcher and Gilchrist. They argued that the negotiators had made
a bad bargain especially in regard to the fact that the railways continued to be owned by the
BSA Company and its subsidiaries. They argued that the whole exercise in London was a waste
of time and was costly. The Railway Act, No. 25 of 1926 was despite these objects passed.
Colonel Frank Johnson heavily criticised clause 2 of the Act which made provision for the
Railway commission. The commission was to be constituted by four members. Three had to be
elected by each government representative. The Chairman was to be elected by the three
governments, and the BSA Company with the approval of the Secretary of State. On this
clause, F. Johnson commented that, "even on such a matter of supreme importance, to the users
of the railways system as the appointment of a chairman, the Railways are to have a say".48
The portions of the system in the territorial jurisdiction of the three governments concerned
were as follows: Southern Rhodesia had 1 252 miles, Northern Rhodesia 506 miles and
Bechuanaland Protectorate 394 miles.49 The Bechuanaland Protectorate with less than one-
third of the railway mileage and infinitely less than one third of the traffic had a voice equal
to that of the representative of Southern Rhodesia. This was unfair to the government of
Southern Rhodesia. It was true that the decision of the commission was not apparently based
on voting and that if any one member differs from his colleagues, "the question at issue shall
be decided by the chairman" 50 Colonel Johnson argued that the decision by Chairman was
some what far stretched for if his decision was not liked by any government representative, or
the Railway Companies, he would refer the issue to a referee appointed by the Secretary of
State. This showed that the powers of the commission were limited. All expenses of the
commission were to be met by the Railway companies and treated as working expenses. This
according to the Railway Vigilance committee was only a different way of saying that they will
be paid by the users of the Railways and so become a prior charge before and possible reduction
of rates.51 _ . . . . . .
The Railway Commission had to ensure that charges were adjusted to ensure that standard
revenue calculated in terms of the Act was received by the railway companies. Thus the
Commission had to wring from the available traffic standard Revenue to meet all debenture
interest, provide dividend for the BSA Company and build a reserve fund. The total standard
revenue was £1,244,000. As long as traffic was maintained, the standard Revenue could be
provided without increasing rates and charges. Before 1930, two great competing lines for the
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Congo traffic had to be completed. The lines were from Lobito Bay and Boma at the mouth of
the Congo Elisabeth ville, the capital of the Congo trade is nearly 400 miles nearer to Lobito Bay
and Boma than to Beira. It was clear that if the traffic to and from Congo fell away to any
considerable extent, the effect would be to jeopardize the economic position of the lines and to
defer the introduction of lower scales of rates and fares for which the public clamoured. Rates
would be increased to meet standard Revenue stipulated. The value of the railways were
inflated and that meant that if the government decided to purchase the railways they would
have been cheated. The Commission could not control the Beira line because out of 600,000
shares the BSA Company had only 295,000 shares. The rest were under the control of the
Mozambique company. Thus the Mozambique company had more say over the Beira line and
the Southern Rhodesian Government could not legislate over that line.
Another criticism levelled on the Railway Act was that with the confirmation of the Railway
Act, 1926, indicated that Southern Rhodesia had placed the Railways in the hands of an
absolute monopoly. In the Act, it was stated that even if thereservation under the constitution
regarding Railway legislation would be removed, by passing the Bill, the position remained
unaltered. The Majesty's instructions to His Excellency the Governor remained under which
it was provided that, "His Excellency shall not assent in His Majesty's name to any law of any
extraordinary nature and importance whereby the rights and property of His Majesty's subjects
not residing in the colony may be prejudiced".52 This instruction was aimed at the protection
of the BSA Company whose property was the railways and who were not residents in the
colony. The Railway Act analysis showed that it had disastrous impacts on the future of the
railway rates, value of the railways when the State in desperation decided to purchase the
system and on future construction of competing lines. It was against this background, that the
Railway Act, 1926, was passed. The opponents of the Act, condemned the Southern Rhodesian
government for passing the transport system, the very life blood of the colony's future in
absolute monopoly. The: BSA Company was the monopoly which would perpetuate its economic
exploitation of the country. Thus, the opponents argued, the Act indicated a handicap in the
future development and prosperity of the colony. The Act was passed in September 1926,
leaving the railways in full administrative and financial control of the Railway Companies.
Phimister correctly argued that in attempting to deal with Rhodesia Railways in isolation the
Act simply encouraged the diversion of profits from railways to other BSA Company concerns.
By Limiting the dividends of the railways, said H. Williams, a leader of the Reform Party, "you
have merely succeeded in making the Railways which should be used to develop this Colony a
pawn in other games. Profits that might have been made are diverted to promote other
interests of this corporation".53
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1926 RAILWAY ACT AND RESULTS
After the Act was passed, the Railway commission was chosen and Hiley was the Chairman.
The Commission began its work. From the birth of the railways in Southern Rhodesia, settlers
were ever complaining of railway rates. The first railway rates reductions, in the history of the
railways were made in 1918 and this reflected coincidence of interests between settler agrarian
and international capital. The Rhodesia Railways reduced rates for Southern Rhodesia maize
destined for Congolese markets on the ostensible ground that the Railways did not want to lose
traffic. Pressured by 214,257 bags of maize for export and the prospects of falling war time
demand, E R Ross, General Manager of the Railways justified reductions in railway rates.54
That reduction was done in order to facilitate outside markets trade and also because the
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railways were in great need of finance with which to repair equipment which had been
overworked during the war while settlers were in dire need of capital. In 1921, after the
_Arcworth_Report,there^were rate-reductions-on-the-overseas-maizefor export"fronr21s
17s 6d a ton. Thiswas necessary to assist the farming community over a critical financial
period according to the General Manager's view.55 However, in reality, the railways badly
needed financial help. In 1924, rates were reduced by 25 percent for 313 585 bags of maize
hauled over distances exceeding 600 miles. In 1925, the reductions amounted to 20 percent over
800 miles. In 1930, with the highest exportable surplus of 745 010 bags, a flat rate was
introduced to enable farmers in Mashonaland to obtain a share in the expanding market in
Northern Rhodesia.56 From 1930, there was no further reductions until 1942. The 1929/33
world market crisis meant reduced railway earnings and inability to surrender any more
revenue. All the above reduction of rates made should be viewed in the light of the relationship
between railage reductions to a principle which is commonly used in determining rates. The
principle is called "charging what traffic will bear". 57 According to Frankel, this is determined
by considering the flow of traffic. "
Thus the railways were reducing rates in order to stimulate traffic and they were charging
what the traffic could bear. This is made clear by the fact that despite these reductions made,
the farmers still complained of high rates. The rates though reduced were still very high
compared to those in the neighbouring countries. Colonel F. Johnson wrote to the Rhodesia
Herald complaining of high railway rates in 1925. Johnson complained that railway rates on
the following commodities were extremely high compared to other African States, for example,
eggs rates were 60% above the South African rates. Rates for milk and cement were also
higher to those of South Africa.58 In 1925/26 the Rhodesia Railways were going to produce net
profit of over £800,000 which was about half the total net revenue of the colony. Against such
statistical evidence, rates on Rhodesia Railways were crippling the development of the economy.59
The major reason which lead to the creation of the Railway Act, 1926, was to help reduce rates
to enable the economic development of the colony. According to the provision of the Act, the
Railway Commission was going to facilitate this settler objective. However, to their amazement,
"no"60 effective railway rates reductions were made after the commission was created.
Reductions made before were made with the objective of stimulating more traffic for the
railway companies and thus not for the benefit of the settlers. Throughout the commission's
history, no rates reductions were made, instead, rates were increasing. This indicates the
failure of the Railway Act of 1926 to solve the most important problem which had led to its
creation.
In 1926, the companies were requested to show how they used their interests and how the
interests so accrued had increased. The government then asked the Railway Companies to
improve port facilities at Beira and to construct a 20 mile Umvukwese line in 1928.61 In his
letter of December 1928, Downie said that the railway companies failed on purpose to
understand that the settlers interests were in the Beira Port. Downie wrote that, "this is our
home, our whole future including our political destiny is bound up with the Port of Beira and
we cannot stand by...watching our position being undermined".62 The railway did not pay
much attention to Beira Port request. Downie wrote another letter to Newton asking him to
urge Birchenough63 to build the Umvukwese line. The Railways did not show interest. In that
letter, Downie warned Newton that the railways were pursuing "a policy which if persisted in,
will place themselves and the government in separate camps".64
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By 1929, it had become clear that there was a fault in the Railway Act. Gibbons states that
the flow was in the wording of the section dealing with the way in which the Reserve Fund was
to be built up. In the provision of the Railway Act 1926, the Reserve Provision was set at
£350,000 per annum until the Reserve Account stood at £1 million and thereafter £150,000 per
annum until the account was £1,5 million when the reserve provision would cease.65 The
difficulty, argued Gibbons, lay in the fact that there was a delay of nearly six months in the
finalizing of the Railway Accounts, after the end of each year the budget for the next year was
fixed at the beginning of another year. At the end of 1929, the government wanted to ensure
that no more than was necessary was allocated to the Reserve Fund. In support of the
government view that the railway in budgeting for £350,000 for the year 1929/30 were getting
more than they should. Moffat sent Newton following figures "showing roughly how the Reserve
Fund would have piled up under the claim of the Railways:
Reserve Account at the 30th Sept, 1928 £932 000
Reserve Provision for 1828/29 less tax ' " £278 000
Reserve Provision for 1929/30 less tax £278 000
TOTAL £1 488 000
Reserve Provision for 1930/31 less tax £120 000
Reserve Provision for 1931/32 less tax £120 000
Approximated total at the end of 1932 £1 728 000
financial year would be66
Gibbons explains the point emphasised by Moffat in support of the government. He argues
that, the figure on the books at the beginning of 1929/30 year was only £932,000 or less than
£1 million and the Railway Administration could be by letter of the law budget for the full
account of £350,000. Thus the amount was in excess of £1 million but less than £1,500,000, the
total in the reserve could be at lease as much as £1,728,000 before tlje reserve provision
ceased.67 Downie suggested then that the Railways look upon the reserve as full at 30
September 1930 and make no provision for the Reserve Fund but the Railways budgeted
£150,000 for the year 1929/30. The complaint was passed to the Railway Commission and the
latter supported the railways.
On learning of the reaction of the railway company to Downie's recommendations,the Southern
Rhodesian government was displeased. Downie wrote a letter to the High Commission in
London asking for legal advice as how to amend the Act in such a way that the Railway would
not get more than £1.500,000 in the Reserve Account. Downie also complained of the agreement
entered into by the Beira Railways. The agreement permitted the latter to impose such rates
as it thought fit to the possible detriment of Southern Rhodesia. By the agreement, Southern
Rhodesia had been subjected to unfavourable conditions. Downie said on the issue "I find it very
difficult to make up my mind as to what is the attitude of the Railway Companies and the BSA
Company in their relation with the people of this country. It seems...that the railways speak
with two voices and... act with two minds".68 Downie felt that the Railways were most
ungenerous and that the continued control of the railways by the BSA Company was a great
menace to the people of Southern Rhodesia.
I regret to say that I have reached a stage when I am of the opinion that it is not
in the best interest of this country that the Railway Management and direction
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should remain in London and it will be necessary for me (Downie) to consider
what steps can be taken whereby the railways will be controlled from and
managedfrom^Rhodesta69"
Downie's complaint reflected the failure of the Railway Act.
CONCLUSION
The Railway Act of 1926 was, according to Newton, a very much underrated instrument, which
held the railway companies to a profit and reserve balance. The Railway Commission, a baby
of the Railway Act 1926, failed to operate as was anticipated. In fact Leggate, the Colonial
Secretary of S Rhodesia, informed Downie that "the commission is not able to function in the
most important part of its activities."70 This had been displayed on the issue of determining
rates, the acceptable level of profits and the amount to be accumulated in the Reserve Fund.
The foregoing proves that regulations are hot alw"ays~adequate in checking the activities of a
private company as the companies with their superior inside knowledge are able in most
circumstances to "twist" regulations to work in their favour. This is to some extent what
happened in the struggle for the control of railways in S Rhodesia as the indirect mechanism
to control the railways proved a dismal failure. The regulation instituted in the 1926 Railway
Act contained many flaws which were exploited by the BSACo to its advantage. The failure of
indirect state control of the railways should also be seen within the broader political perspective
where imperial (British) interests were in conflict with those of the subordinate colony. This
perspective is best reflected by Ian Phimister who argues that:
Although S Rhodesia won Responsible Government from Britain in 1923,
it was on terms circumscribed by the interest of the metropolitan
accumulation. As the dependent partner, S Rhodesia was obliged to accept
constitutional provisions seeking to guard against initiatives which might
disturb that process. Consequently the settler state found itself ham-strung
when it tried to gain some way over how the railway system was
operated.71
It is within this broader context that the S Rhodesian government failed to effectively control
the railway operation to the advantage of its community and within the context of a broader
economic development plan which guarded the interest of Rhodesians. Given the limitations of
regulations aimed at controlling private companies in charge of public utilities it is no wonder
that the government finally decided to control this life line of its citizens by opting for
nationalization even though it was a costly adventure to the state. The government finally
nationalised the railways in 1949 in the interest of its settler community. The government
directed control of the railways in the interest of a small section of its community. This can be
criticised on the grounds that the white community received too much protection and that it
operated inefficiently given all the favours it got from the state. However, it is important to
note that despite the settler community's inefficiencies, they managed to develop certain aspects
of the economy to a relatively significant level. If the level of economic development within
different colonies were to be compared it is interesting to see that settler dominated economies
fared better than those which did not possess a significantly high white population. Several
reasons account for this higher level of development and chief among them is the fact that the
settler communities pressured the state to promulgate legislation that protected their interests,
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albeit at the expense of the black majority. This is true if one compares such countries as
Kenya, S Rhodesia and South Africa with Ghana and Nigeria which had an insignificant
number of white settlers.72 In the former three the level of industrial sophistication, economic
growth rates and the social over-head capital investment at independence was much higher.
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ANNEXURE "A"
SCHEDULE TO SHOW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BSA CO. AND THE VARIOUS
RAILWAY COMPANIES.
RAILWAY
COMPANY
Rhodesia Railway
Company Ltd
Mashonaland
Railway Co. Limited
The Beira -Junction
Railway Co. Ltd.
Beira Co. Ltd.
Blinkwater Railway
Company.
TOTAL SHARES
ISSUED
8 000 shares of £1
each.
450 000 of £leach
250 000 ordinary
shares 425 583
cumulative
preference shares at
5/-each
600 000 ordinary
shares no value
expressed
200 000 shares by
£1 shares.
RHODESIA
RAILWAY TRUST
PARTICIPATION
7 989 shares
449 612 shares.
EXTENT OF
CONTROL BY
BRITISH S.AFRICA
COMPANY
Total through
approximately 85 %
stake in the Trust
Co.
All 425 583
cumulative
preference shares
held giving BSA
Co.full control.
Voting power in
respect of
3(|6 000 ordinary
shares in vested in
BSA Co.to 1942.
All shares held by
Beit Railway Trust
and most of
Trustees were on
BSA Co. Board so
in the same hands.
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The Rhodesia
Katanga Junction
Railway and
Minerals Rail
Company.
Quoted in Gibbons, E. G.
£800 000 each 5.5 %
debentures.Bulk of
shares held
originally by
Tanganyika
Concession Ltd. but
in 1925 Hamwood
was unable to state
exact position.
TheBac
JBSAJCQ.
represented
Rhodesia- Katanga
Co. but not a
sufficiently large
holding either
directly or indirectly
to give it control,
the actual line
leased by Rhodesia
Railways and
Mashonaland
Railway Companies.
cground to the Rhodesia Railways Act 1267
22
TABLE TO SHOW THE PROPORTION OF REVKIIUr. DERIVED FROM TRAFFIC l/I'i'H THE CONGO WIRING fJHE YEARS 1924 TO 1929
„,,„
INSCRIPTION OF
TRAFFIC
General Goods -• —
Railway Construction
Materials
COal and Coke for tho
Public
Copper for export
Oijiher materials
excluding chrome ore
arid lead
£
TO & FROM
THE CONGO
617 205
125 426
551 634
413 294
900
1708 459
1926
TO & FROM
OTHER
POINTS
1316 046
149 527
3 344
77 399
1546 316
TO ft
THE
343
313
398
515
1571
1925
FRCvi
CONGO
925
845
083
r'39
130
TO C-. FRa-1
O'i'lIEJi
P O I N T S
1136 000
135 945
9 803
99 010
1381 558
TO £
TIIE
234
89
341
493
2
1211
i i?RQH
COiiGO
023
9B6
079
618
277
783
1924
TO fib FOM
OTHER
POINTS
985 910
. —
136 090
15 828
96 852
1201 680
£3 254 775
52,5£ 47,5^
•12 952 733
46,8;-
£2 413 463
150, Si
Information obtained from the Report of the General i-iana^ er of the Railways for the years 1924 - 29
AN'KEflFiU "IS" cont.
Table To Show The Proportion Of revenue Derived From traffic v/ifch -The Co.nf-ro During The Yeara 1924 to 1929
1929
DESCRIPTION
TRAFFIC
OF TO a. PfiOIlTIIK CONGO
TO & l?ROii
OTHER
TOIMTO
TO £, FliGK
THE OOIJGO
TO ^
OTTIiiU
192?
O^ O fi PHOr. TO Sc FROM
TIJE CO1-IGO OTHER
POINTS
General Goods
Railway Construction
Material?
Coal and Coke for the
Public
691 640
'Copper for e
01
xport
her i&giterials
>eluding chrome
oije and lead
information
724- 452
516 264
1 103
1775 909
16 650
210 415
42 107
238 727
567 1601 853
2 6c 9
662 159
260 328
1933 659 ?33 306
710 680
519 310
63
208 : 22
37
40 224
1923 091 1999 925
04 759
10
1615 362
30 315
195 651
22 470
87 906
1833 900 I949 704
217 '165
45,85^ 40
obtained from the report of the General Ma
xo 923 061
- 5O,Vi.i
ai' of the Kai
5'3 738 604
the Years 1924 - 1929
ANHEXUHE "0"
THE RAILWAY LINES
KEY
IT • HH G DE G X.
Boundary lines
Railway lines
Towns
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?ABLS SHOWING aHEHT RATES
RAILV/AY RATES
AHKEXBHE "D
FOR HAULING OF 375 MILES PER gQN
C omnodity 3 . Rhodesia Itate3 3.Africa Raton
Rails and steepers
Cement
Fencing
Flour
Cheese
I/heat & nil grain
Petrol
Fresh fruit
Cotton Lint
6
1
4
Q
i
3
3
1
13
15
13
15
13
13
11
2
11
5
3
0
2
0
;,
T2
2'
5
1
1
1
2
0
7
2
1
1
8
4 •
4
10
15
0
u.
*-r
2
2
2
0
0
p
'•••. oTTO'R'T? ~ T A I L OV ' !0 ^
Commodity
Beeon l
Cream & mill:
Tobacco :
7e?:etables
1
1
1
0
• > COS'? FiZ!: '?0fr MTI^
.Rhodesia Hates
S CL
3 4
3 4
5 0
13 4
?000 I
o.Afr
o
o
o
o
o
lea
s
l
ii
11
C-
11
6
<:l
0
0
"1
• - '
0
Quoted in the l:hodesia Herald 23/10/25
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